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Ahmet Davutoğlu's Foreign Policy Understanding: A Blend of Westernist and Multiculturalist Eurasianism

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Given that Turkey has increasingly been pursuing an active and multidimensional foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, discourses of Eurasianism have been perceived as one of the dynamics of this foreign policy course. In particular, Turkish foreign policy has undergone significant changes in its understanding during the Davutoğlu era, beginning in 2002. Accordingly, it may be claimed that Westernist and multiculturalist Eurasianism discourses have frequently been interpreted by the polity and consequently implemented in foreign policy-making in Turkey. This article examines how Turkish Eurasianism and its various discourses have been embraced and implemented by Ahmet Davutoğlu, first as a foreign minister and then as the prime minister of the Republic of Turkey. In the examination of this era, the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism are also briefly conceptualized and presented.

Keywords: Eurasianism, Turkish Eurasianism, Westernist Eurasianism, multiculturalist Eurasianism, Turkish foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoğlu

Depuis la fin de la Guerre froide, la Turquie a poursuivi une politique étrangère active et multidimensionnelle, et les discours sur l'Eurasisme ont été l'un de ses axes privilégiés. Durant la période de Davutoğlu, à partir de 2002, la politique étrangère turque a subi des changements importants dans sa compréhension du monde. Depuis cette date, les discours sur l'Eurasisme occidentaliste et multiculturaliste ont été fréquemment interprétés et mis en œuvre dans l'élaboration de cette politique étrangère. Cet article conceptualise brièvement et présente les discours sur l'Eurasisme turc et examine les façons dont ils ont été adoptés et mis en œuvre par le Premier ministre en exercice, Ahmet Davutoğlu, d'abord en tant que ministre des Affaires étrangères, puis en tant que Premier ministre de la République turque.

Mots-clés : Eurasisme, Eurasisme turc, Eurasisme occidentaliste, Eurasisme multiculturaliste, politique étrangère turque, Ahmet Davutoğlu

Introduction

There is a wide consensus among the students of international relations that Turkish foreign policy between 1923 and the early 2000s may be

divided roughly into four periods: an inter-war period (1923–45), the Cold War era (1945–1980s), a period of a new world order (1990s), and the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) era (2002–present) (Larrabee and Lesser 2003; Küçükcan and Küçükkeleş 2012; Hale 2013;). These periods differ from each other. Generally speaking, until the 1980s, Kemalism had the upper hand; it was able to permeate and shape every level of society, and it was publicly unchallenged. In political life, this resulted in the emergence of a Kemalist civilian–military bureaucratic structure which did not allow elected governments to fully implement their own foreign policy programmes (Laçiner 2001, 281).

However, these conditions have gradually changed since Turgut Özal's election.¹ With the rise of Ahmet Davutoğlu, pro-activism in Turkish foreign policy has increased further. The foreign policy understanding of Davutoğlu and the AK Party has been multidimensional, similar to that of Özal and İsmail Cem.² While Özal stressed building economic relations with countries in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia, and Cem pointed out that Turkey was overlooking the importance of historical and cultural elements in foreign policy–making, Davutoğlu has made efforts in both directions to broaden Turkey's foreign policy horizon and to integrate cultural and historical dimensions into the Turkish foreign policy–making process (Küçükcan and Küçükkeleş 2012). For instance, for the first time in history, during the AK Party era Turkey has had embassies/consulates in almost every country in the world. In this way, this period differs from other periods of Turkish foreign policy since 1923.

Therefore, this article first briefly examines the discourses of Eurasianism. Then, a special emphasis will be put on whether the discourses of Eurasianism have been applied or performed during the Davutoğlu era in Turkish foreign policy. In doing so, a number of indicators, which have been determined and chosen after in-depth analyses of Davutoğlu's speeches, mindsets, and initiatives, will be used to examine whether this period presents any Eurasianist approaches, explicitly or implicitly. In this regard, this article will reveal the impact of Eurasianist ideology in the Turkish foreign policy–making during the Davutoğlu era.

Discourses of Turkish Eurasianism

Eurasianism began as a way of thinking, an ideology or geopolitical approach, intended to save the Russian Empire from collapse and to create a propitious sphere including all Eurasian nations. This version of Russian Eurasianism, or classical Eurasianism, had various discourses, which is one reason that Russian Eurasianism faded away around the 1930s. Having many participants and eminent founders who were

dwelling in different countries of Europe and various discourses caused the disappearance of Eurasianism until Gumilev's efforts to put together neo-Eurasianism. Gumilev's followers A. Panarin and A. Dugin made enormous contributions to neo-Eurasianism during the 1990s. However, Panarin's death left Dugin as the sole ideologist of neo-Eurasianism.

Whereas classical Eurasianism did not manage to penetrate Turkish society, neo-Eurasianism has been perceived in various ways among the Turkish intelligentsia. It might be considered that there are two reasons that neo-Eurasianism has found more acceptance than classical Eurasianism. The first is that Turkey has been a convenient sphere for ideologies: the belief that Turkey has had a glorious history with regard to the Turkic ethnic roots facilitates new and stimulating ideologies. In addition, Turkey has started to embrace a new way of understanding throughout this glorious history. That has been one of the catalysts which has created an appropriate environment for eastern-oriented ideologies. The second reason is that the perception that "The only friend of a Turk is a Turk" has affected the Turkish identity-building process, generating a tendency among some nationalist circles to become conscious of any threat by anyone seen as an *enemy* of Turkey. That is why these circles support sustaining the "balance-of-power" rhetoric, especially against the Western world, by promoting ideologies such as neo-Eurasianism.

The Turkish intelligentsia's encounter with Russian Eurasianism occurred through Gumilev's and Dugin's works. In particular, Dugin's initial thoughts, which aimed to exclude Turkey from a prospective Eurasian union, were not welcomed in Turkey and caused Turkish intellectual circles to perceive Russian Eurasianism as a Russian imperialist ideology, even if Dugin later revised his approach to Turkey. Most of the discourses of Eurasianism are thus built on ideologies such as Islamism, Turkism, and so on. In light of this information, the discourses of Turkish Eurasianism can, in general, be classified into three separate types (see Table 1): nationalist Eurasianism, multiculturalist Eurasianism, and Westernist Eurasianism.

It is widely believed that Islam, the Ottoman heritage, and nationalism are three of the main influences on Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. In theory, because Islam dismisses differences in culture, language, ethnicity, geographical proximity, and so on among its followers, it has the potential to build a sense of shared identity. Since Ottoman times Islam has therefore been perceived as a vital common denominator between different groups of subjects, such as Turks and Kurds. For that reason, Islam is influential in Turkish approaches to domestic and foreign policy. On the other hand, the majority of Turkish citizens adhere to Ottomanist discourses, despite disparaging Kemalist discourses toward Ottoman history. Along with Islamist and Ottomanist

TABLE 1
Adherents of the three discourses of Turkish Eurasianism

Nationalist Eurasianism	Multiculturalist Eurasianism	Westernist Eurasianism
Anıl Çeçen (professor)	Attila İlhan (author, poet)	Erel Tellal (professor)
Şener Üşümezsoy (professor)	Doğu Perinçek (leader of the Patriotic Party—jailed for a while during the Ergenekon trial)	Sami Güçlü (former minister)
Özcan Yeniçeri (professor)	Mehmet Perinçek (PhD—jailed for a while during the Ergenekon trial)	Nabi Avcı (incumbent minister of national education, member of Parliament)
Ümit Özdağ (professor)		Akkan Süver (president of the Marmara Groups Strategic and Social Research Foundation)
Namık Kemal Zeybek (former minister)		Hakan Fidan (incumbent undersecretary of the National Intelligence Organization)
Suat İlhan (retired lieutenant general)		
Ali Külebi (acting president of the National Security Strategies Research Centre)		
Arslan Bulut (author, columnist, researcher)		

discourses, Turkish nationalism also has a dominant effect on Turkish society. In particular, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rightist parties have always kept alive the tendency for unification with the Turkic states that emerged in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This is why ultra-right parties in Turkey have been in favour of forming a Turkic-nationalist discourse for a long time. In addition, although pan-Turanianism's targets are highly unlikely, it has been a motivator to think of or embrace a much wider area, similar to Eurasianism.

In light of this knowledge, the following table summarizes the features of the three Eurasianist discourses. In line with the discussion, this summary draws attention to the overlapping expectations of the discourses, even though they differ from each other regarding the meaning of Eurasia and their sources.

These three discourses have similar perspectives regarding Turkey's role and importance in the region. They all focus on the Turkic states' facilitative role in order to create an environment for Turkey to promote Turkish Eurasianism as it derives from these kin states' presence. However, when it comes to the content of the prospective Eurasian union, they have separate visions, based on their reservations about Russia and the Western states. While some of the nationalists claim that

TABLE 2
Differences between the three discourses

	Nationalist	Multiculturalist	Westernist
Eurasia	Turkic states (if necessary Russia)	All Eurasian states (except Western states)	All Eurasian states
Turkey's place	Leadership together with Russia	Leadership	Significant player
Sources	Turkishness, anti- imperialism, patriotism, pan-Turkism, Islamism, Ottomanism	Cultural dialogue, anti- Westernism, anti-imperial- ism, pan-Turanianism	Turkishness, Westernness, Ottomanism
Expectations	A Eurasian power for a better future,	A Eurasian power for a better future	A Eurasian power for a better future a democratic state

Russia might be a member of the union (if necessary), some of the multiculturalists have the same reservations about the Western world (except the United States).

Regarding Turkey's place in this union, they all have different arguments. The most ambitious one comes from the nationalists, as they see Turkey as the leader of the union. While the multiculturalists argue that Turkey and Russia might share the leadership, the Westernists propose that Turkey might be one of the significant players in the union. In addition, there are several different means to prepare the ground for a prospective union. Last, their expectations are generally considered to be the same, as they all claim that such a union would promote a better future for the benefit of Turkey. In addition, only the Westernist discourse emphasizes democracy, while it argues that the Eurasian continent is one of the most important regions for Turkey and must be taken into account along with the Western world.

The Davutoğlu Era: A Blend of Westernist and Multiculturalist Eurasianism

Following the November 2002 elections, Davutoğlu was appointed as chief adviser to the prime minister and ambassador at large by the 58th government of the Republic of Turkey. He continued to serve in the 59th and 60th governments. On 1 May 2009 he was appointed as the minister of foreign affairs of the 60th government of the Republic of Turkey and carried on this position in the 61st government. And in August 2014 he became the prime minister of the Republic of Turkey.

Davutoğlu owes his reputation to his book, *Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position* (Davutoğlu 2009). Some claim that Davutoğlu's book is one of the works that has inspired the masses and influenced small

but powerful elites and their mindsets (see Ersoy 2009; Walker 2009; Balcı 2010; Kanbolat 2011; Kasapoğlu 2012). In his book Davutoğlu claims that the consolidation of political and economic stability would enable Turkey to play a peace-promoting role in neighbouring regions. His concept of *strategic depth* in order to help Turkey transition from being a peripheral actor in world politics to a central one features two elements: geopolitical inheritance and historical-cultural inheritance. These are the main components that differentiate Turkey from its neighbours (see Aras 2009; Walker 2011).

Davutoğlu (2010) conceptualizes his strategic depth doctrine through four principles: “[a] secure neighbourhood based on a common understanding of security, pro-active, high-level political dialogue with all neighbours, fostering regional economic interdependence and finally, promoting ‘multi-cultural, multi-sectarian peace and harmony.’”

In light of this way of thinking, Davutoğlu has repeatedly been criticized for being neo-Ottomanist or Eurasianist, even if he has rejected these claims at every turn. Yet signs of Eurasianism can be identified in his discourses and actions. To prove this claim, four indicators are presented below.

Indicator 1

On 24 November 2009, Davutoğlu stated:

Former US President Bill Clinton asked me why Turkey is actively dealing with the regional problems; I answered, Draw a circle with a diameter of 1000 km around Turkey and 20 states will fall into it. Then draw one with a diameter of 3000 km and 70 states will fall within. If we draw a similar circle around the US, how many states would fall into that? In this sense, of course Turkey will continue dealing with the problems of our neighbours (2009).

This discourse explicitly reflects Eurasianist thinking. From Panarin’s perspective, ethnic nationalism should be condemned as a product of Europe’s pagan sentiment. In this regard, states in Eurasia should deal with each other’s problems regardless of religion, race, colour, creed, nationality, social status, and so on. From this perspective, the effects of this understanding can be observed during the AK Party era. For instance, since 2002, the amount of Official Development Assistance and humanitarian assistance provided by Turkey have grown substantially. According to the *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013*, Official Development Assistance from Turkey almost doubled between 2011 and 2012. This increase made Turkey the 15th-largest government donor in 2012 (see Figure 1). Furthermore, the increase of official humanitarian assistance to \$US1 billion in 2012 made Turkey the fourth-largest donor




FIGURE 1
 Top 20 government contributors of international humanitarian assistance, 2003–12 (\$US billions)




FIGURE 2
 Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Turkey, 2000–12 (\$US billions)

in 2012 (see Figure 2) (Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013). It is worth mentioning that, unlike in previous periods, in this era Turkey’s assistance has not concentrated solely on the surrounding area. While Turkey has continued to provide assistance to Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries, a significant amount of assistance has been given to certain countries in Africa and South Asia as well (see Figure 3).

In line with the ideology of Eurasianism, in the Davutoğlu era Turkey has been seeking to expand its sphere of influence through




FIGURE 3

Top 10 recipients of Turkey's official humanitarian assistance, 2007–11 (\$US millions)

public diplomacy. The governmental institutions which conduct public diplomacy are the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (the principal body for administering aid) and the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) and Turkey's Disaster and Emergency Management Office (bodies for humanitarian aid). These institutions provide, organize, and distribute humanitarian aid as an aspect of public diplomacy. It would not be wrong to claim that they have become much more active, with a wider range, during the Davutoğlu era. As is seen in the figures above, the amount of humanitarian aid has been increasing steadily during the Davutoğlu era. This might be considered as an extension of Eurasianism; to quote Davutoğlu, "Turkey will continue dealing with the problems of our neighbours" (2009).

In this sense, at first glance, Davutoğlu's and Panarin's approaches overlap. A condemnation of ethnic nationalism and a commitment to deal with each other's problems regardless of religion, race, colour, creed, nationality, social status, and so on are two of the main elements of Davutoğlu and Panarin's understandings. Although this indicator reveals whether Davutoğlu pursues a Eurasianist foreign policy, there must be more indicators, as it is not sufficient on its own.

Indicator 2

There are other factors that indicate that Davutoğlu has embraced an element of Eurasianist thinking. For instance, Davutoğlu alleges that Turkey is a “central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character” (2008, 78). That is why “in terms of its area of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country” (Davutoğlu 2008, 79).

In this regard, Turkey is economically and politically relatively stable, making it a viable international actor in these regions. In this context, while the incumbent government wants to exert political, economic, and cultural influence within the former Ottoman lands, it also strives to open up new horizons by improving its relations with states from the Yellow Sea to Latin America. An obvious example of this is the transformation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Davutoğlu era. As an extension of his understanding of Turkey as a central country with multiple identities, Turkey has opened new embassies and consulates worldwide. While Turkey had 39 missions abroad in 1924, it is now represented by 222 missions worldwide. In addition, the Turkish Foreign Service has 2 183 diplomats, at the ministry and its missions abroad, despite criticisms that this number is excessive (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011).

Yet Turkey's broadening relations with countries worldwide are a sign of a Eurasianist way of thinking. On this account, Turkey's opening needs to be clarified by informative figures about Turkey's and neighbouring countries' diplomatic missions abroad (see Figure 4). According to Figure 4, Turkey has one of the largest global networks of diplomatic missions compared to economies of similar size, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel.

It is a fact that having more than 200 diplomatic missions abroad requires a decent economy. Turkey is considered the 17th-biggest economy in the world (*CIA World Factbook* n.d.). However, most economies of similar size do not have as many missions abroad as Turkey does. For instance, while Brazil is the 8th-biggest economy, it has 194 missions abroad (Ministério das Relações Exteriores n.d.). Further, while India is the 4th-biggest economy in the world, it has only 164 missions abroad (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India n.d.). These figures show that, as mentioned before, Turkey has a distinctive foreign policy understanding that is based on Turkey's geopolitical centrality and on its enormous cultural and historical heritage and belongingness to Eurasia that makes Turkey itself responsible for the whole region in Davutoğlu's way of thinking.




FIGURE 4
Number of diplomatic missions of selected countries abroad

These kinds of goals and policies seem like a small-scale Eurasianist vision, especially in the building of relationships with both the Western and the Eastern worlds. In addition, it may even be alleged that the AK Party's foreign policy stance in the post-2005 era represents the transition from a Western orientation to an Eastern orientation, or, as Ziya Öniş and Şahnaz Yılmaz call it, "soft Euro-Asianism" (2009, 13). Having said that, they define the soft Euro-Asianism approach as "foreign policy activism pursued with respect to all neighbouring regions but with no firm EU axis as was previously the case" (13).

In this sense, this indicator substantiates that Turkey's axis is not shifting, just getting wider. It would therefore not be logical to claim that Turkey is pursuing an Eastern-oriented foreign policy nowadays. As Öniş and Yılmaz repeat, Turkey is striving to build relations with all the neighbours around it. In this, it should be emphasized that the new vision considers that it is Turkey's fate to deal with its neighbours' problems, as Turkey is a central country. Therefore, from time to time Davutoğlu is accused of embracing an Eastern-oriented foreign policy, but it seems that this is not true—the horizon has simply been broadened, and the relations with the European Union or the West are just a part of the foreign policy, not all of it, as once was the case.

Indicator 3

While Eurasianists attribute importance to the geopolitical location of Russia, Davutoğlu also puts forward the uniqueness of Turkey and its position. According to N. S. Trubetskoy, "The territory of Russia ... constitutes a separate continent ... which in contrast to Europe and Asia can be called *Eurasia*.... Eurasia represents an integral whole, both

geographically and anthropologically” (qtd. in Wiederkehr 2007, 1). This separate continent was a self-contained geographical entity whose boundaries coincided roughly with those of the Russian Empire in 1914 (Halperin 1982, 481).

Similarly, by alleging that Turkey cannot be “explained” geographically or culturally by associating it with a single region, Davutoğlu seeks to emphasize the geographical significance of Turkey:

Turkey’s geography gives it a specific central country status, which differs from other central countries. For example, Germany is a central country in Central Europe, which is far from Asia and Africa. Russia is another central country in the lands of Europe and Asia, which is far from Africa. Iran is a central country in Asia, which is far from Europe and Africa. Taking a broader, global view, Turkey holds an optimal place in the sense that it is both an Asian and European country and is also close to Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean. A central country with such an optimal geographic location cannot define itself in a defensive manner. It should be seen neither as a bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West (2008, 78).

Obviously, this is a Turkish interpretation of Eurasianism, with a clear emphasis on Turkey’s centrality. In this framework, Davutoğlu argues that Turkey is the glue which brings together Europe and Asia, just like Russia in the mindset of classical Eurasianism during the 1920s and 1930s. Therefore, Turkey is destined to play a significant role in this region instead of pursuing a passive foreign policy course. This way of thinking has clearly influenced the current foreign policy course of Turkey, and “pro-activism” is one of the terms used to describe the approach of the Davutoğlu era.

Davutoğlu’s approach reveals itself in recent developments, such as the relations with Africa and initiatives in southern Asia. This indicator shows that Davutoğlu is again stressing Turkey’s centrality, with a clear emphasis on how its responsibilities and identities derive from its distinctive geographical, cultural, historical, and anthropological features. The recent developments are clear examples of this understanding. For instance, Turkey’s opening to Africa can be considered as a significant outcome of this policy. While Turkey has had observer status in the African Union since 2005, the Africa–Turkey partnership was established by the signing of the Istanbul Declaration and the Framework for Cooperation in 2008. Both parties have aimed at a stable, long-term partnership based on mutual interests and equality and the promotion of Africa–Turkey cooperation in specific areas of interests. While this opening toward Africa can be considered as an extension of Davutoğlu’s interpretation of Eurasianism, Turkey’s presence in Afghanistan as part

of the International Security Assistance Force is another initiative which confirms that the Turkish foreign policy course has been formulated to be more globally engaged, economically and diplomatically, by reaching out beyond the former Ottoman territories. Regarding its presence in the International Security Assistance Force, for Turkey it is more than a NATO-led mission. It is a duty of being a Eurasian state. The following statement by the incumbent president of the Republic of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, emphasizes this point: “NATO planned to complete its mission in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, but it was not definite. It may happen after 2014. As Turkey, we think of leaving Afghanistan after all countries leave. We would not leave our brothers alone there unless Afghanistan wanted Turkey to” (*Haber 7* 2012). It is a fact that the rationale behind these policies can be explained only by Eurasianism, in particular the Westernist Eurasianist discourse.

Indicator 4

In a speech on 4 February 2010, Davutoğlu proclaimed:

This is the basis of what the classical Eurasianists wanted to establish via a Eurasian union. According to them, Eurasianism provided a theoretical structure to prevent the collapse of the Russian Empire. In the event of its collapse, the theory sought to build a new nation encompassing the whole Eurasian people under a single Eurasian state. This state would have a unique culture reflecting the characteristics of all the Turanian races instead of the Russian element. (The Turanian nations include, according to the Eurasians, the Finno-Ugric nations; Samoyeds; Turks [including Ottoman Turks]; various Tatars; Bashkirs; Turkmen; Kirgiz; Yakuts; Chuvash; a few extinct peoples such as Khazars, Polovtsy, and Ugurians; and, finally, Mongols and Manchurians.) In this vein, as Davutoğlu points out, an increase in political dialogue, economic interdependence, and cultural interaction would constitute the primary phase of founding the union.

There is a need to embark on a new vision in order to have the Eurasia region regain its historical importance.... If peace and welfare do not reign in Eurasia, it is not possible to make peace and welfare reign in the world, either. This region can export peace and welfare to the rest of the world.... The western and eastern ends of Eurasia should be reconnected (*Daily Today's Zaman* 2010).

The statement above, made by Davutoğlu on 5 February 2010, is a call for a Eurasian union, and it is an unquestionable indication of the Eurasianism in his thinking, especially the multiculturalist Eurasianist discourse. This call has been a touchstone in terms of evaluating the dynamics of Turkish foreign policy.

It can be seen that during the Davutoğlu era the inclination toward Eurasia and the influence of Eurasianism have been gradually increasing. Unlike Özal and Cem, Davutoğlu promotes it and claims, to some extent, that the European Union and the Western world are obviously necessary for Turkey but that the Eastern world is much more important. In his thinking, Turkey needs the European Union but not as much as the European Union needs Turkey. Furthermore, if Turkey becomes a genuine player in Eurasia, it will definitely become indispensable for the European Union. For this reason, Turkey should aim to spread cooperation to the Eurasian continent and make peace and welfare reign in it. But we do not know whether it is a viable project yet, as the region is full of dictatorships and undemocratic and underdeveloped states. In addition, we do not know whether they want cooperation and peace in the region.

Conclusion

Although Eurasianism was an ideology that first appeared in Russia during the 1920s, it has had some reflections in Turkish foreign policy every now and then. While some of those reflections have been obvious, some have not been clearly expressed. In this article the Davutoğlu period of Turkish foreign policy has been analyzed, and the conclusion is that the discourse of Eurasianism in various forms has been widely applied in this period. The discourses of Westernist Eurasianism and multiculturalist Eurasianism have generally been embraced by Ahmet Davutoğlu and the AK Party to shift the course of Turkish foreign policy.

While the reason for embracing Westernist Eurasianism is that it is the most moderate and plausible discourse in terms of keeping good relations with the neighbouring countries, multiculturalist Eurasianism has also been embraced as another means to building an economic powerhouse for Turkey. This multiculturalist discourse has been observed during the Davutoğlu era when he explicitly proposed that a Eurasian union should be formed if humanity wants peace and welfare to reign in the world.

However, although the Davutoğlu era presents both discourses—Westernist and multiculturalist—from time to time, none of the discourses has been promoted as the state ideology during this period. Instead, the discourses have been applied when needed. Yet it might be observed that during the Davutoğlu era, the application of Eurasianism has reached to the highest level within Turkey.

Notes

- 1 Turgut Özal was sworn in as president of Turkey on 9 November 1989. On 17 April 1993 Özal died in office of a heart attack.
- 2 İsmail Cem served as a Turkish foreign minister between 1997 and 2002. He was one of Turkey's longest-serving foreign ministers

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