

# **Trends and Transformations in World Politics**

# Trends and Transformations in World Politics

Edited by Özgür Tüfekçi and Rahman Dağ

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## *Chapter Seven*

# **Trends and Transformation in world Politics through the Eyes of the Leading IR Scholars**

Rahman Dağ and Özgür Tüfekçi

### **CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR ANDREW LINKLATER<sup>1</sup>**

*Question:* We would like to start asking about your view of the contemporary international community. In *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*, you argued that “Sovereign nation-states have been deeply exclusionary in their dealings with minority cultures and alien outsiders. And through globalization, the pacification of core areas of the world economy, and ethnic revolt, new forms of political community and citizenship have become possible.”

Considering the lack of solidarity in the international community manifesting in, for instance, the cases of different political preferences between developed and developing countries, economic and political cracks among the developed countries, the refugee crisis, and the recent COVID-19 outbreak, do you still believe that such community is possible?

*Andrew Linklater:* The argument was that the triple transformation of political community (more universalist, more sensitive to cultural differences, and more committed to the reduction of material inequalities) is an immanent possibility in modern societies. The emphasis was on normative ideals that are already anticipated by the development of modern conceptions of citizenship. The point was to highlight the positive qualities of those

loyalties to stress the resistance of many groups to any attempt to transfer powers to international organizations.

The point has significance for understanding Brexit and the national-populist surge more generally with its focus on exercising greater power over events through the reassertion of state power and national loyalties. But hopes will be dashed. States will remain at the mercy of forces they cannot control without major advances in international cooperation. Many groups understand that, of course, but the problem of balancing national and international responsibilities and attachments remains unsolved.

*Question:* Since you are one of the leading critical IR theorists, what do you think about the place of critical theory and the role of critical theorists in the world today?

*Andrew Linklater:* Frankfurt School critical theory was an important influence on the normative position outlined earlier, but it has had little impact on the sociological perspective I have worked on over the last fifteen or so years. I have found richer resources in Eliasian process sociology.

The relationship between critical theory and process sociology is enormously complicated. Elias was opposed to partisan investigation. He was a powerful advocate of what he called the “detour of detachment”—of research that was not driven by taking sides in contemporary social and political struggles.

Not that Elias was indifferent to human conditions. It has been argued that a form of secular humanism underpins his perspective and that he was highly critical of nation-centered academic approaches and public policies given the problems affecting humanity as a whole. For Elias, detachment was integral to that humanism. Only by understanding more about uncontrolled social processes could people discover ways of alleviating misery and insecurity.

Critical theory and process sociology are at odds in many respects, but they converge in important ways as argued in my forthcoming book on civilization and world order. All I will add is that process sociology provides means of analyzing the social world that go beyond critical theory and other approaches with which I am familiar.

Thank you for your time and sincere answers.

## CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR ANDREW MORAVCSIK

*Question:* Your research shows that you have quite an interest in liberal inter-governmentalism and liberal theories of IR. Many of your recent publications are associated with the EU. We would like to start our questions with what has

a pro-Western government for which they would fight. It has subsequently provided tens of billions in foreign aid, signed major trade agreements, provided opportunity for migration (and remittances), adjusted energy policy, engaged in active diplomacy, enacted sanctions on Russia to support Ukraine, and provided support for democracy and the rule of law, which has now born fruit. Without these things, the country would long since have collapsed. In addition, the West has provided some military assistance, but this started some years after the transition and is smaller and less essential. Third, this Western support—with the exception of the military component—has come almost entirely from Europe. A recent study by the German Marshall Fund, in which I was involved, shows that about 90 percent of the aid, trade, sanctions, diplomacy, energy policy, and the rule of law activity—not to mention the initial inspiration—comes from Europe.

*Question:* Global pandemic over coronavirus has shaken the liberal international order because most of the states are turning to their self-interests, and we have heard that third parties have confiscated several medical cargos. Could you please give us your insights about the future of the EU and the world after the pandemic?

*Andrew Moravcsik:* Again, this question entirely misses the point. Self-interest is not the opposite of liberal international order, but its basis. Obviously, in the crisis, every state has (rightly) looked after its own medical interest. And perhaps here and there states made short-sighted decisions. Why not? After all, no international organization—even the EU—has jurisdiction over medical care. Underneath the surface, however, massive cooperation is going on among government officials, corporations, researchers and universities, and civil society groups.

*Question:* We know that we cannot cover all your research and ideas, as they are too much to grasp within such a short interview. Could you please tell us about any issues that we might have missed but are quite important to you?

*Andrew Moravcsik:* I work on many topics, including the need for rigorous qualitative and historical work using digital means, EU foreign policy, liberal theory, human rights policy, and even the sociology of classical music. All my work is on the web, and I would be pleased to answer questions on any topic.

*We would like to thank you for your sincere answers and time.*

## CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR ANSSI PAASI

*Question:* While we were going over your studies and research, it was impossible not to realize that you have been working at the same university since 1989. If you do not mind, could you please tell us what is the reason for



## CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR IRA WILLIAM ZARTMAN

*Question:* Having looked at your teaching background, it is impossible not to realize that you have been at the center of conflicts in the world before or after these crises erupted. For instance, you worked and went around all Middle Eastern and North African countries. You've experienced these conflictual areas, breathed their air, and drunk their waters. Please, let me start with a personal question. What do you think is the most vital feature of the Middle East as a source of conflict eruption? If you do not mind, it is better for us if you could share some of your significant memories regarding the most vital feature of the Middle East as a source of conflicts in the region.

*William Zartman:* The Middle East is people by one large family, riven with its component tribalism, a traditional segmentary system as the anthropologists write about, more prone to rivalry than to unity. What if they had united against a common enemy (another Semitic tribe)? Israel would be in the sea, like the crusaders, and they would have been free to fight among themselves, which they would have done with gusto.

*Question:* To continue with the general question, in the Cold War era, almost every conflict had two sides in parallel with the international system. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, or Eastern Bloc, it is claimed that the multipolar world system has begun. Does it mean that, since the 1990s, national or regional conflicts have multiple parties naturally and that is why current conflicts are not easy to solve or cool down?

*William Zartman:* It means that the Cold War contenders are unable to keep things simmering but not boiling, that the field is open for them to look for power vacua to occupy preemptively, and that middle powers can then pick their local parties (states and nonstates). It's a fisherman's holiday with no game warden.

*Question:* This next question may complement the previous question. In your chapter titled "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments" in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes* (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2003), you basically argue that peace negotiations or processes can be commenced only when the warring parties feel that they do not get any result in this conflict. So there become two options, either the stalemate position continues or there is consent to form a negotiation table. In a multipolar world system, each warring party can easily replace their financially and politically supporting power with another one because there are alternatives to align with. The only thing warring parties do is to act accordingly. Thus, as long as there is a possibility of finding international support, how do you think that a stalemate would be possible?

*William Zartman:* I would emphasize, as a continuation of the previous answer, that it is crucial and urgent for the Atlantic Alliance to restore its purpose and cooperation, and I am addressing not only the new US administration but also the herding cats of Europe. And it is equally crucial for the Pacific Rim to do the same, here addressing the US in the first place. That would be a great step toward dealing with the fragment conflicts problem and the world disorder.

## CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR GERARD TOAL

*Question:* Your educational background shows that you have experienced a remarkable journey via combining history and geography with a geopolitical approach toward post-Communist conflicts. Could you please share your experience of that journey with us? What is your primary motive to study these territories, and how did you end up combining the geographical study of nationalism with geopolitics?

*Gerard Toal:* Thank you for the opportunity. As those who have read my work will know, or struggled to pronounce the Gaelic version of my name, I come from a borderland county in the Republic of Ireland. I grew up at the height of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Without really thinking about it, I gravitated toward the study of conflict regions, to borders and nationalism, and to the imperialist attitudes one often finds in such situations. It is, I suppose, an accident that the university where I started my academic life did not have a politics department. Unconsciously, my geographically shaped perspective found expression within the disciplines of geography and history. My primary motivation, to the extent that one can ever identify such a thing consciously, is to question the seemingly innate desire of people to claim territories for their own group to the exclusion of others. So much conflict is tragic in its impacts and consequences. There is injustice, and this should be brought to light, but I've always been wary of the allure of nationalism, or at least, I came to that position pretty quickly in university when new horizons of thinking were made available to me.

*Question:* In one of your publications, you claim that the concept of the "Russian World" is controversial. How much credit do you give to the idea that Russian cultural, historical, and linguistic influence is quite influential in attracting people of the states that once were under the Soviet Union or Russian Empire?

*Gerard Toal:* The collapse of the Soviet Union was a traumatic event for millions of people, liberating to be sure for many but also deeply disorienting for others. I remember attending a conference entitled "Eastern Europe,

*Gerard Toal:* Well, there are certainly many who argue that Russia needs a strong state, just as there are many who argue that, as the central power in on the Eurasian landmass, it has an eternal geopolitics. I take both of these claims seriously as forms of discourse but don't believe they are analytically correct. The constitution that Russia has is a result of choices that the political elite is making.

*Question:* In one of the interviews you gave in 2012, you mentioned a global pandemic as one of the most significant geopolitical challenges for the world in the twenty-first century. Nowadays, we are experiencing such a challenge. What is your geopolitical projection on the post-COVID-19 world?

*Gerard Toal:* Aye, one easy geopolitical question after another! Where to begin? I do think that COVID-19 is a profound structural shock to the system of global geopolitical competition. I am also convinced that this is a "critical juncture" in US-Chinese relations and that China is seeking to take advantage of the crisis to project power and influence across the world. The United States, by contrast, is in a terrible state, saddled with a disastrous president and manifestly failing state institutions. To many across the world, the United States is not a model world, the vanguard of modernity, but the system to avoid. There are two immediately crucial questions going forward: Who will develop the COVID-19 vaccine and garner credit for its distribution across the planet, thus saving millions of lives? And, will the United States renew itself in November 2020, presuming we get to have an election and Trump, seeing he is likely to lose, cancels it or overly cheats? I am biased in that I want the United States to rally and renew itself. Perhaps an emergent China will be a catalyst to it doing so in a positive constructive manner. But that may be wishful thinking, unfortunately.

*Question:* Thank you for your time and sincere answers. It is not possible to cover all issues in an interview. Please add here any significant points or topics you think we have missed.

*Gerard Toal:* Thank you for the opportunity. I hope Turkey is able to play a positive and constructive role in the collective security challenges we face across the planet.

## CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR JOSEPH NYE

*Question:* It is an honor to have a chance to conduct an interview with you. Looking at your academic career from undergraduate to now, it is apparent that you have gathered amply significant memories and experiences. Could you please share some of them with us that are quite determining to your career?

*Question:* Thank you for your time and sincere answers. We do not want to miss what is essential to you if the previous questions do not cover it. Could you please elaborate on an issue by yourself as a closing question?

*Joseph Nye:* Trump is famous for his slogan “America First.” All leaders have a responsibility to put their own country’s interests first, and Trump is not unique in that. The important moral choice is how broadly or narrowly a leader chooses to define those interests. But the United States responded to COVID-19 with an inclination toward short-term, zero-sum, competitive interpretations, with too little attention to institutions and cooperation. As I show in my new book, *Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump*, this administration has interpreted “America First” narrowly, stepping back from the long-term, enlightened self-interest that marked the American approach designed by FDR, Truman, and Eisenhower after 1945. The Marshall Plan is a good example of using a broad definition of the national interest. It was good for the United States’ interest in preventing the Soviet takeover of western Europe, but it was also good for Europe struggling to recover from the devastation of the Second World War.

We can apply that model to the current COVID-19 crisis. Attacks by new viruses may come in waves. In 1918, an influenza epidemic killed more people than died in the horrors of the First World War. Many people thought it had ended when it abated in the summer, but the second wave in the fall of 1918 was more lethal than the first. There is much we still do not know about this new coronavirus, but we must be prepared for a multiyear battle. That will require sharing information; developing and producing therapies and vaccines; and preparing, manufacturing, and distributing medical supplies and equipment. It is quite possible that there will be seasonal surges of the virus between the Northern and Southern hemispheres. When the North thinks it has a respite, the virus (or a mutation) may fill a Southern reservoir only to spill northward with the change of seasons. We should have a COVID-19 Marshall plan for poor countries.

### CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR KATHARYNE MITCHELL

*Question:* Before moving on to substantive questions, we would like to ask you a personal question. It might seem to be a cliché, but we still wonder what made you want to study spatiality, multiculturalism, and neo-liberal citizenship? If possible, could you please share a couple of moments with us regarding your academic journey?

## CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR KNUD ERIK JØRGENSEN

*Question:* We would like to start the interview with a general and common question. Could you please tell us about what has led you to study the EU from a constructivist perspective? It would be perfect if you could just share some of the moments and events in your academic career.

*Knud Erik Jørgensen:* After a brief career detour, working in a municipality administration, I returned to Aarhus University in 1988 to do a PhD. I had secured external funding from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) to analyze Western Europe's policies toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Having prepared, during the early 1980s, a somewhat long graduate thesis on the Polish opposition (KOR, Solidarnosc, etc.) within the framework of perspectives on social movements, I was new to the discipline of IR.

I entered the discipline at a time when the keyword in world politics was CHANGE. The Polish social movement *Solidarnosc* made a comeback, and other dissident groupings made it from dissidence to government offices. During the autumn of 1989, I prepared part of my thesis at Chatham House in London, listening to excellent speakers and their situation reports during the daytime, then taking the tube to my flat in Shepard's Bush and finding out, upon arrival, that the situation in the meantime had changed. Gorbachev had launched the *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* renewal of the Soviet Union and in 1991, having jumped on a tank, Boris Yeltsin addressed the masses, announcing the end of the Soviet Union and the birth of Russia. Helmut Kohl announced the reunification of Germany, and the European Commission launched the ambitious 1992 project aimed at creating what we know as the EU.

Within the world of the discipline of IR, things were predominantly different, less change-oriented.

When navigating the theoretical landscape at the time and selecting my theoretical framework, I took guidance from COPRI, specifically Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, who flirted with combinations of (reconstructed) neorealism and post-positivist approaches, including speech act theory. Hence, I pragmatically included a reconstructed neorealist framework in the thesis and continued to explore the post-positivist perspectives on the side. Not so much the poststructuralist approaches Wæver (and subsequently Lene Hansen) was attracted to, but the social constructivist middle ground, occupied at the time by Emanuel Adler, John Ruggie, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Alexander Wendt. They represented a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between ontology and epistemology, and while it was developed with a view to IR,

*Knud Erik Jørgensen:* In my mind, there is fierce competition among several strong candidates. Should my prime concern be the combined effect on world politics of media conglomerates, bot farms, social media giants and companies such as Cambridge Analytica? Should it be resource scarcity and the multiple and seemingly successful exercises inland and ocean grabbing? Or should it be the irresponsible and seemingly unchecked international behavior of autocrats? I think my prime concern is the combined effect on world politics of these three factors.

Thanks a lot for your time and sincere answers.

### CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR MICHAEL C. WILLIAMS

*Question:* In your book *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations* (2005), you have examined three leading realist figures and come up with the concept of “wilful realism.” As you know, these three prominent thinkers had been influenced by their political and social surroundings. Thomas Hobbes lived in a conflictual environment where wars were all around, Rousseau experienced the eve of social upheaves leading to political transformations all over Europe and Morgenthau witnessed two world wars. We have to admit that the book is emphasizing a distinctive deal of realism, but we would like to ask about your personal experiences that led you to reexamine the core realist thinkers, at least mostly accepted ones. Have you had this thought in your mind since your college years or has something else triggered you to think in this way?

*Michael Williams:* I suppose the first thing to say, which may help explain my views on realism, is that I did not begin life as a realist. On the contrary, I first encountered IR as a student of the renowned “critical” theorist RBJ Walker, and throughout my university studies, I was (and in many ways still am) critically inclined or oriented in my thinking about much of what passes as, or claims to be realism in politics. Politically, most of this period also corresponded with the so-called “second Cold War” and the Reagan administration’s foreign policy agenda, particularly its assertive nuclear strategy. In this context, certain kinds of realism—such as those associated with the strategist Colin Gray and his assertion that in nuclear conflicts, “victory is possible”—seemed to me part of the problem, not the solution. But one of the principles of critical thinking I admire is to try to understand the positions you disagree with as well as (or even better than) they understand themselves. So, I began to dig into “classical” realism as a means of assessing its followers, and the more I did so, the more I found a perspective whose depth seemed

it represents a reaction against them and is connected to wider geopolitical shifts. The ways in which these dynamics play out over the next decade will be an important part of determining the shape of the emerging world order.

*Question:* As you know, as a stage of securitization theory, you have reconsidered the concept of “extraordinary” in one of your latest articles in 2015, titled “Securitization as political theory: The politics of the extraordinary.” Your paper has a theoretical feature, but we would like to ask you a question regarding practice. Could you please tell us what you would say if somebody claimed that the increased number of conflicts all over the world is proving that extraordinary politics is already in place?

*Michael Williams:* Security as the politics of the extraordinary has always been with us. Although it can seem that this kind of politics is on the increase, we also have to balance this perception against the fact that global awareness of extraordinary politics has never been higher. The sheer volume of information, often connected to the “spectacular” dynamics of modern media, means that it is necessary to be cautious about seeing an explosion of extraordinary politics, though this does not mean that its prevalence is not a matter of concern. Also, of course, we need to remember that extraordinary politics is not always negative: the breaking of existing norms that it implies can be a source of progress, even if its potential for violence needs always to be kept in mind.

It seems to me that the greater explosion of extraordinary politics in a negative sense may lie in the risk-security domain, where we see a proliferation of exceptional measures that are less spectacular, more subtle, and un-coordinated, but that result in the increasing intrusion of marginally exceptional, unspectacular, and thus less visible and legally and democratically accountable, political practices across the globe.

*Question:* We really do not want to lose an opportunity to get as many insights as from you, and before ending the interview, we would like to ask you if there is an issue we missed asking about but you think it is paramount. If there is, could you please tell us about it as closing comments?

*Michael Williams:* I think I have probably said enough! Thanks for your excellent questions—and your remarkable patience.

## CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR NICHOLAS ONUF

*Question:* Before starting the interview, would you allow me to ask about your career adventure. You are known as one of the founding fathers of constructivism in IR. We wonder how and when did you decide to work on it? Any memories would be appreciated.

*Nicholas Onuf:* Early in my scholarly career, I had focused on theoretical issues in International Law, including the time-honored question,



of your readers. In my answers, I have not indulged my ongoing interest in providing constructivism with suitably robust philosophical foundations. Instead, I have tried to link constructivism to another longstanding interest of mine, which is the unfolding of the modern world over five centuries. My most recent book treats these two interests as converging projects, although the book says relatively about constructivism as an explicit frame of reference. In this interview, I have tried to remedy this oversight, at least with respect to the world situation as I see it today. As I wind down my scholarly career, this interview may indeed be my last stab at making sense of the world we have made for ourselves—the modern world.

### CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR PETER M. HAAS

*Question:* Before getting into the questions, if you do not mind, could you please share some of your memories that shaped your academic career and approach to IR?

*Peter M. Haas:* I grew up in an academic household. My father raised me with an appreciation of history. My salient memory from college and graduate school was receiving the advice that the environment was not a major element of IR. I hope I've proven them wrong.

The most significant eureka moment was when I was conducting my dissertation fieldwork around the Mediterranean. I had pretty much been trained as a historical materialist and expected to find that country's concerns mirrored their exposure to marine pollution. My initial interviews, luckily, turned me into a constructivist when the response from environment ministers to my questions about their understandings of the environmental problems facing their country was "I don't know, what do you think?" So, I realized that problems had to be framed and interpreted, they weren't obvious.

*Question:* Your research history shows that your focus on the concept of "epistemic communities" is extremely high, and also your case studies on how epistemic communities can construct internationally common policies either on environmental issues or potential conflicts. Based on your theoretical approach with the concept of the international order, how would you evaluate the US's reluctance to be a part of global environmental issues in the last couple of years?

*Peter M. Haas:* While top-level US pronouncements—particularly withdrawing from Paris and the current WHO shaming—run in the face of expert consensus, lower-level decision making in the United States remains informed by ecological norms and understandings. Midlevel scientists in the EPA and Commerce Departments continue to try to issue evidence-based assessments of global warming.



Because we simply don't know the trajectory of the virus, it is pointless to speculate deeply at this point about the future of the world order. As we know from responses to systemic shocks, the international community can either drop the ball (the 1930s) or respond collectively and effectively (the post-Second World War liberal world order). I would imagine that the WHO's reputation will suffer, although Chinese behavior is consistent with prior behavior. A deeper concern is about the wider spread loss of support for multilateral institutions, including the WHO, UN, and WTO. There may well be a large transfer of responsibility for health care delivery to NGOs.

We would like to thank you for your sincere answers.

### CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR RICHARD SAKWA

*Question:* Let me start with introductory questions. Could you please tell us about your personal background, where you grew up and went to high school, your degrees and how you ended up being a student of IR, and what were the cornerstone events or times that directed you to this end? Furthermore, what was the academic climate during your student years? Who were the intellectual influences on your thinking during those years?

*Richard Sakwa:* I was born in Norfolk, England, in rather interesting circumstances. My father was a reservist officer in the Polish Army before the war, and in the end, after the defeat escaped to Palestine and joined General Anders' Second Corp, which fought with the British Eighth Army in El Alamein, Tobruk, Sicily, Monte Casino and all the way up Italy to Bologna. At that point, as the war came to an end the whole mass of soldiers expected to take a train over the Alps back to Poland. However, that was not to be. Stories filtered back about what was going on. For example, my uncle Tadeusz (which is my middle name) served with the Home Army, and their unit leader managed to survive five years of German occupation, but he surfaced near Lublin in late 1944 and was promptly shot by the NKVD. In the end, my father, who by then had married my mother who was part of the French community in Alexandria, ended up as a refugee in England. They had planned to emigrate to Argentina and had even bought a plot of land in Santa Rosa on the River Plate, but the night before they were due to sail a mine bobbed into Alexandria harbor and damaged the ship. After living briefly in the shabby and war-damaged London the family took up a small farm in Norfolk. Hence my early years were shaped by war, an inadequate post-war settlement, displacement, and contingency. What if the mine had not damaged the ship? I would have ended up speaking Spanish and defending Las Malvinas, instead of supporting the rights of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands.

In short, all that the crisis has done is demonstrated once again the intellectual and political bankruptcy of the post-Cold War international system and highlighted its dangerously militaristic turn.

*Question:* Covering all your studies within a short time seems impossible, as there is a massive pile of original research. Therefore, we would like to leave the stage to you for any issue we might forget to ask, but you think it is important. If there is an issue you want to speak to, please enlighten us about it?

*Richard Sakwa:* There are plenty of other issues we could talk about, but one very much on my mind at present is the cultural roots of the Second Cold War. The problem is as much civilizational as it is geostrategic. One central factor is the “exceptionalist” ideology in the US, which after 1945 became embedded in what Michael Glennon calls Trumanite “deep state,” a vast security apparatus that swallows up vast resources for no clear purpose other than the maintenance of US hegemony and leadership; while this very same “military-industrial complex,” against which Eisenhower warned in his farewell address in 1960, diverts resources away from making the US not only a powerful country but also more socially just and rich in all senses of the word. The exhaustion of the political West encourages Russia and China to develop alternative models of international politics. This emerging, although relatively diffuse, bipolarity will shape international politics and globalization for the foreseeable future.

*We would like to thank you for your sincere answers and time.*

## CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR ROBERT JERVIS

*Question:* Your conceptual and practical contribution to international politics is remarkable and inspiring. We wonder about your academic journey. To fill this wonder, could you please share some of your unforgettable moments or events that led you to the IR or motivate you to do more work?

*Robert Jervis:* It was a combination of what was happening in the “real” world, reading that I did on my own, a gifted instructor, and a friendship with a leading scholar that set me on this path. Being born into a politically aware family in 1940, my early memories are filled with politics, especially international politics and the start of the Cold War. I was gripped by the question of how to respond to what most of us saw as Soviet expansionism, and particularly how force and threats could be used to protect our interests without leading to war. Readers of chapter three of *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* know that this question has never left me. While attending Oberlin College from 1958 to 1962 debates about the “missile gap” raged (only later would we learn that there was a gap—but one that favored

rooted less in changes in material factors like the costs of war (although these indeed are important) than in the development of better ideas and a grasp of the interdependencies in the international system that require due respect for other state's rights and interests and protection of the valuable weaker states and intermediary bodies. In my APSA presidential address, I took the middle ground that what I called the leading powers (the US, the states of western Europe, and Japan) formed what Karl Deutsch called a security community (a group of states that were not only at peace with each other, but among whom war was unthinkable) and that this was a real if limited form of progress. Let's work toward building on and expanding it.

### CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR SIMON DALBY

*Question:* Taking this interview as an opportunity, we would like to hear, if you do not mind, about a moment or an event that has been paramount in your academic career.

*Simon Dalby:* Perhaps the moment that sticks in my memory most is the one and only time I made a presentation at the United Nations. It was part of a panel presentation on climate and security back in the months prior to the Copenhagen Climate summit in 2009. After all, five of us presenters were finished the session was opened to comments from the national delegates. One refused to accept that climate change had anything to do with security, a second said the whole topic was mind-boggling. In response to my comment that if policymakers thought that it was appropriate to build fences around their states to keep people from moving, they weren't thinking hard enough, another delegation got up and walked out. Their government was, in fact, building fences, although I had an entirely different fence in mind.

I learned once again that day just how hard it is to get clear messages concerning academic research across to even sometimes sympathetic policy audiences, and the importance of thinking ahead about what is coming regardless of the reluctance of policymakers to hear what you are trying to say. Alas, as the COVID-19 pandemic teaches us all once again this isn't a problem that has gone away since, and it remains a major difficulty in dealing with climate change and other environmental transformations.

*Question:* There has been a significant number of discussions on the path that the world is taking in terms of the world system or international order. Your prominent work of *Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics* reemerged with a reprint edition in 2016, and we do not think that it is a coincidence because the early 1990s were at the edge of systemic change and now the discussion has resurfaced among the academics and politicians.

these days, and this is a task that needs to be taken up by scholars, and crucially by university administrations and granting agencies; the questions of the twenty-first century are frequently not amenable to research grounded in nineteenth-century disciplines.

Asking how questions are formulated, and what these formulations preclude is now an essential task for all scholarship that addresses the pressing issues of how the world is being dangerously transformed. But simply assuming that better research will provide the solution to complex problems isn't enough either; confronting the power structures that have perpetuated human problems, rather than ensuring human security for many, is also a necessary part of our academic task and critical interventions in the policy and political debates in the aftermath of COVID-19 are unavoidable now.

### CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR STEPHAN HAGGARD

*Question:* The pile of your research shows that you have a quite interest in the political economy of Latin America and east Asia and seems that your recent publications are mostly associated with east Asia. We would like to start our questions with the following: What has directed you to research this region? Could you please share a couple of memories or events that led you to this path?

*Stephan Haggard:* When I wrote my dissertation and first book, *Pathways from the Periphery* (1990), I was interested in the comparison between Latin American and east Asian political economies. But I spent more time for that book researching the east Asian cases, perhaps because I felt less was known about them. The work on the developmental state was emerging from Chalmers Johnson, Robert Wade, and Alice Amsden, but, to me, none of them addressed the political aspects of rapid growth in a satisfactory way.

Since that time, however, I have not just worked on east Asia; I have also been interested in transitions to and from democratic rule (including in Turkey). My work with Robert Kaufman started by looking at the political economy of these questions (*The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*, 1995), before turning to the social policy consequences of democratization (in *Development, Democracy and Welfare States*, 2008). Most recently, Bob and I have returned to questions of democracy in two books with a more global focus: *Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change* (2016), and a forthcoming short book on *Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World*.

I think my identification with east Asia also comes out of a very chance encounter with North Korea, that has developed into a prolonged fascination:

other policies. With the benefit of hindsight, the great growth tragedies of the post-war period—outside of extreme autocracies and civil war cases—came as a result of financial crises.

*Question:* This question might not seem to be related to your area of expertise, but as a prominent scholar in your field, you might have something to say about possible outcomes of the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of the global political economy?

*Stephan Haggard:* There are many obvious issues here, such as the need for better international cooperation around international public health. But the question is an embarrassing one because the American performance has been so scandalously bad. To me, this is actually a good way to wind up. The United States has exhibited many of the causal factors we associate with democratic backsliding over the last four years: an autocratic personality and a fawning party providing support. Yet deeper forces were also at work, including a deep polarization. The central debate in the United States at the moment is over the nature of that polarization. Was it economic, rooted in declining manufacturing and increasing inequality? Was it racial and ethnic, as I believe? And what role did social media technology play in making it all worse? It will take some time to rebuild the United States from four years of drift, and that includes with respect to the damage we inflicted on ourselves by mismanaging the pandemic.

*Question:* We would like to thank you for your answers to the questions, and we want to give you a moment to make comments on anything we may have missed but you consider important.

*Stephan Haggard:* I enjoyed our time together. Thanks for reaching out to me.

## CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR TERRY NARDIN

*Question:* We would like to start the interview with a biographical question. Could you please tell us about what led you to work on international political theory and the philosophy of international law? It would be perfect if you could share some moments in your academic career.

*Terry Nardin:* I studied philosophy as an undergraduate at the University of Chicago and then at NYU but worries about nuclear war led me to become increasingly interested in international affairs. I had a charismatic teacher at NYU, Anthony Pearce, who introduced me to the field of IR via Thucydides, Machiavelli, Mackinder, Nehru, and other classics of international thought. As a graduate student, I learned about game theory and its application to IR by reading books like Thomas Schelling's *The Strategy of Conflict* and Anatol Rapoport's *Fights, Games, and Debates*. After I started teaching, I got

give us your insights about the future of the EU and perhaps the world after the pandemic?

*Terry Nardin:* Sorry, no, that would be a prediction, which I've just said is futile. Sometimes disaster tears people apart and sometimes it brings them together. It is certainly one lesson of the pandemic that viruses do not respect national boundaries. We live in one world in relation to this and many other aspects of our increasingly unsustainable human order. It's not clear to me that IR theory has much to contribute to figuring out how humanity is going to deal with the grave and multiplying challenges it faces.

*Question:* We might not be able to cover all the issues which are important to you, so let us close by inviting you to share your biggest concern about world politics in our era.

*Terry Nardin:* I hope you will forgive me for challenging the premises that underlie some of your questions. I hope that you can agree that it makes for unexpected and perhaps interesting answers. I've been teaching and writing for many decades now and am not the specialist in IR or political theory that I once was. As one ages, one sometimes outgrows the preoccupations of one's discipline and even one's younger self. You might say that my approach has become more multidisciplinary, but that is increasingly common across the academic world. The changes we call globalization might have contributed to this. For solutions to problems of world order, we now look beyond the disciplines of IR or political science. But also need to understand, not simply to act. And to understand the world, we need to look beyond the practical disciplines to history and philosophy, to the sciences and arts. Sometimes our concern with solving practical problems leads us to a narrow focus on what is important, as if the desire for knowledge is driven by curiosity rather than practical need were unimportant. But we won't be better off if the liberal arts are dismissed as irrelevant in an age of existential challenges and are marginalized or even suppressed in the same economic advantage or political order. As for world politics, we must try to make it better, but we must also not give up on trying to make sense of it. We like to think we are actors, but often we are merely spectators, and it is hubris to think otherwise.

### CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR THOMAS G. WEISS

*Question:* You have extensively contributed to global governance and United Nations literature. Your research is now among the must-read works for those who are studying IR. We would like to ask you what really triggered you to work on these issues and, importantly what really kept you working

## About the Editors and Contributors

**Özgür Tüfekçi** is associate professor of international relations at Karadeniz Technical University in Turkey. He is also founder and director-general of CESRAN International, a UK-based think tank ([www.cesran.org](http://www.cesran.org)). He holds a master's degree in International Studies from the University of Sheffield and a PhD in Sociology and International Relations from Coventry University. His primary research interests are (Turkish) Eurasianism, nation-building, theories of nationalism, geopolitical studies, rising powers, and regionalism. He published a monograph titled *The Foreign Policy of Modern Turkey: Power and the Ideology of Eurasianism* (2017) and co-edited *Domestic and Regional Uncertainties in the New Turkey* (2017), *Eurasian Politics and Society: Issues and Challenges* (2017), and *Politics of Conflict and Cooperation in Eurasia* (2018). He is also the editor in chief of *The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development*.

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**Richard Sakwa** joined the University of Kent in 1987, was promoted to a professorship in 1996, and was head of the School of Politics and International Relations between 2001 and 2007. In 2010, he once again took over as head of school until 2014. While completing his doctorate on Moscow politics during the Russian Civil War (1918 to 1921), he spent a



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**Luis Tomé** is a professor at the Autonomia University of Lisbon in Portugal, where he is currently director of the Department of International Relations and the Observatory of Foreign Relations. He has also been a visiting professor at the Portuguese Military University Institute, the National Defense University, and the Higher Institute of Police Sciences and Homeland Security, as well abroad at La Sapienza University of Rome, the Academy of Social Sciences and Technology in Angola, the East Timor National Defense Institute, and the Middle East Technical University in Turkey.

From November 2015 to October 2017, Luis Tomé was special advisor for International Relations and Fighting Terrorism of the Portuguese minister of home affairs. Previously, he was a NATO-EAPC researcher for two years (author of the 2000 report “Russia and NATO’s Enlargement”) and advisor to the vice president of the European Parliament (1999 to 2004).

Tomé earned a PhD in International Relations from the University of Coimbra, a master’s degree in Strategy from the Technical University of Lisbon, and a bachelor’s degree in International Relations from Autónoma University of Lisbon. His main areas of research and expertise are International Relations, Geopolitics, and Security Studies, with a particular focus on Euro-Atlantic, Asia-Pacific, and Eurasia regions.

He is the author and co-author of a dozen books and numerous articles and essays. Luis Tomé has been a regular speaker at high-level conferences and workshops in the country and abroad and a frequent commentator on security and international politics for the media.

**Sónia Sénica** is a researcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations. She was coordinator of a research project at the Luso-American Development Foundation (2016), a participant in the course “Diplomatic Protocol” of the École Nationale d’Administration in Paris (2008), a post-graduate in “Theory and Diplomatic Practice” at the Lusíada University of Lisbon (2004), a participant in the course “Russia and the Contemporary World” at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign



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**Andrew K. P. Leung** is a prominent international and independent China strategist. Over forty years' experience in senior Hong Kong government positions; twice handed over to Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam as director-general of social welfare and director-general London; China Futures fellow, Massachusetts Berkshire Publishing Group; brain trust member, IMD Lausanne Evian Group; Gerson Lehrman Group council member; Thomas Reuters expert; senior analyst with Wikistrat; elected member of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs; advisory board member, European Centre for e-Commerce and Internet Law; think tank research fellow, Beijing Normal University, Zhuhai Campus; visiting professor, London Metropolitan University Business School; honorary president, China Hong Kong Economic and Trading International Association; formerly governing council member, King's College London; advisory board member, China Policy Institute of Nottingham University; and visiting professor, Sun Yat-sen University Business School (2005 to 2010). In the 1980s, he oversaw Hong Kong's industrial transmigration into mainland China and helped launch the Quality Campaign and Technology Centre. He was invited by the US government for a month-long visit in 1990 to brief Fortune 50 CEOs personally, including one-on-ones with Steve Forbes of *Forbes* magazine, on China post-1989. In 2002, he was invited by Prince Andrew for a private briefing leading to HRH's first official visit to China as UK's ambassador for trade and investment. He advised on cross-cultural management in Lenovo's take-over of IBM Computers, and he was invited as editor at large for an international consultancy on China's energies. He is a regular contributor, commentator, and speaker on China at international conferences and an interviewee on prominent international TV channels worldwide, including BBC, Sky, CNN, ABC, Aljazeera, RT, TRT, Times Now, Chanel News Asia, CGTN, National Geographic, etc. His topics include trade, finance, economics, geopolitics, international relations, science and technology, sustainable industrial development, and green cities. He has graduate qualifications from the University of London, postgraduate qualifications from Cambridge University, PMD from the Harvard Business School, and solicitors' qualifying examination certificate from the Law Society, London. He has been included in UK's Who since 2002 and was awarded Silver Bauhinia Star (SBS) in July 2005 on Hong Kong Honors List.

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