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Iryna Tkachuk
Department of International Relations, Institute of Social Sciences, Karadeniz Technical University, e-mail:

Ozgur Tufekci
Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University, e-mail:


During the last 25 years, Brazil has been providing an activist foreign policy not only in its own region but also in the world. The article highlights the peculiarities of Brazilian peacekeeping policy on President Lula’s grand strategy during the term between 2003 and 2011 in line with its international and defence policy. In particular, the article mentions the main features of Brazilian peacebuilding, such as the reservation of humanitarian interventions, as the use of force leads to an increase in violence and instability. The participation of Brazil in peacekeeping operations is discussed, paying particular attention to its main characteristics and compliance with national interests, which are laid down in the country’s grand strategy.

KEYWORDS: Rising Powers, UN, Brazilian Foreign Policy, Peacekeeping Operations


Participation of member countries in BRICS is considered a format of cooperation that enables them to consolidate their own regional leadership as opposed to the US-EU cooperation and to support their own national interests. In this sense, the security policy of the BRICS countries is an essential component of their collaboration. They implement this policy through the use of a forum to strengthen the international credibility of the group’s countries as a framework for peace and stability. One of the aspects of cooperation is the participation of BRICS countries in the security discourse within the UN, where they are actively involved in solving security issues both at the regional and international levels. These countries declare their interest in the growing role of the United Nations; even the BRICS Summit documents always have provisions on the issue of reforming the UN, including the Security Council.

Brazil has always been a dominant country in South America, not just because of its territory and population but mostly because of the biggest economy in the region. Having this strong advantage, Brazil never tried to get the role of being a real leader. For a long time, its foreign policy was primarily focused on economic development and gaining autonomy in relation to the United States.

The years of military dictatorship contributed to the formation of a vast number of weak governments, which were usually not effective for the people. Brazil began to modernise after electing President Fernando Henrique Cardozo. He initiated significant changes in the economy of the region, which was continued by the next President, Louis Ignacio Lula da Silva. Consequently, the foreign policy of Louis Ignacio Lula was characterised by the preservation of already selected priorities, strengthening independence in decision-making, first of all from the United States. Under the leadership of President Louis Ignacio Lula, the country has become a significant player. Consequently, with the growth of the Brazilian economy, the confidence of the country in international politics increased.

So can a country play a more critical role in the global context? Of course, the answer to this question is related to the level of the country’s multilateral relations with other actors of international relations. States form their foreign policy from their material or ideal interests with which they build their interactions with other states and relevant actors in the global environment.

A grand strategy is a form of national planning to achieve a long-term goal. A grand strategy provides a national vision of the future and a precise plan for implementing this vision. In fact, this is a state course, which is formed on the basis of a clear definition of the national goal and the correct allocation of state resources for achieving the goal (Feaver, 2009). Historically, the need to formulate a grand strategy was due to the presence of an enemy. Thus, the aim of state politicians was to develop a coherent national strategy, combining military force, political leverage and economic power.

In the case of Brazil, after years of dictatorship in the country, state leaders have been chosen to strengthen Brazil as a significant global player. One of the ways to achieve this goal was the participation of Brazil in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations. The aim of this paper is to find an answer to the question, “How joining UN peacekeeping operations has influenced Brazil’s grand strategy and helped Brazil to be a rising power?”. Participation of Brazil in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN can prove (or refute) the possibility of a state transition from the status of a middle player to a global player. This paper examines the Brazilian motivation to participate in peace operations and its impact on international politics during the period of Louis Ignacio Lula’s presidency (2003-2011). The first section will give us an understanding of the priorities in the Brazilian foreign and defence policies and how they relate to its peacekeeping policy. The following section will provide a quick historical overview of Brazilian participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), pointing to a unique Brazilian peacekeeping model and defining the interests of Brazilian participation in UNPKO. In the last part of this paper, we will make general conclusions and answer the research question.

Categorisation and Conceptualisation of the Rising Powers

With the beginning of the 21st century, the acceleration of globalisation and political developments has brought a comprehensive evolution process in the global economic arena. When we look at this transformation process, the financial crisis, which emerged in the USA in 2008 and had a profound effect on the world economy in a short time, became a vital breaking point that accelerated the transition to the new order (Dag and Tufekci, 2022). Two main trends have shaped the course of this transformation since the beginning of the crisis. First of all, it analyses that developed Western countries are experiencing a decline in their capacity to sustain economic growth and to reflect their power in the political and economic fields at the international level have gained popularity. Western economies, which could not achieve the desired growth after the crisis, have tended to lose their transformative powers and moral superiority in the international system (Dag and Tufekci, 2023). The weakening of liberal democracy in the West and the gradual increase of separatist and xenophobic movements throughout Europe are essential examples of the erosion of legitimacy.

Secondly, it managed to overcome the crisis with relatively minor damage; Countries that have started to make their weight felt more in the global economy by increasing their share in world production and which are called rising powers, have become the dynamo of the global economy (Onis and Kutlay, 2011: 20). Therefore, it has become a trend to classify these countries, which are on the rise by making a rapid leap, attracting a large part of foreign direct investments, and whose capacity to influence the global economy is rapidly increasing, according to their actual GDP growth figures. In this context, classifications such as BRICS, MIKTA, MINT, MIST, PINE, Next 11, and CIVETS have started to be made. These countries, which are more active in their foreign policies and strong in their regions, also have the potential to be role models and demand more voice in international decision-making mechanisms in parallel with their increasing economic weight. In this context, how the rising powers will impact the course of the international system has turned into a new big question that is sought to be answered today (Onis and Kutlay, 2011: 20).

Although the concept of rising power has become a popular concept used by researchers and academics in recent years, it can be said that the theoretical literature on rising powers is insufficient and controversial. One of the significant shortcomings in this literature is conceptualising emerging powers by considering only their economic and military strengths. In other words, although there is no generally accepted definition of the concept, there is little consensus in the literature on which countries should be included in the status of the rising power, when and under what conditions they can be called rising powers, and when they are or will become great powers. However, the most obvious common point for the countries described as emerging powers is their high economic growth potential. In this context, it is accepted that these countries can reshape the global economic and political landscape of the 21st century (Hart and Jones, 2010: 65). On the other hand, they are defined as countries that strive to take on more influential roles in the system and change their power dynamics through international and regional organisations (Tank, 2012: 2-4).

In the article published in International Affairs magazine in 2006, Andrew Hurrell emphasised that the rising powers have four standard features. First, he stated that these countries, in addition to their growing economic power, have a relatively high military and political power capacity, a reasonable degree of internal consistency, and the ability to contribute to establishing a new global order. Secondly, underlining that the emerging powers want to play a more effective role in global issues, Hurrell stated that the relations and cooperation between these countries had deepened bilaterally and within regional and international institutions. Finally, he emphasised that a distinction can be made between the other Western “middle powers” and the majority of the rising powers. He stated that unlike Canada, Japan or many European countries, the emerging powers have never been fully integrated into the post-1945 international system with their sometimes opposing stance (Hurrell, 2006: 1-2).

Miller (2016: 217) characterised the emerging powers as the actors expected to be included in the category of great powers shortly and expressed the three characteristics of the emerging powers as follows: they try to increase. Secondly, they aim to globalise their national interests by assuming responsibilities in the international system through their allies and the organisations they are members of. Finally, emerging powers must provide internal acceptance and support that their role and status in the current system have changed.

Rising powers can influence the international order regionally or globally, primarily through the contribution of their material resources (usually the size of their economy, geography, population and military strength). What makes these countries important is that they have acquired enough power to change the direction of global politics and economy (Hurrell, 2006: 2). Emerging powers are often positioned differently from industrialised economies in the structural context. However, they can influence the international order -to a certain extent- with their material resources. However, not all emerging powers have achieved similar growth rates, particularly within the BRICS.  Yet, in the financial and economic literature, the main argument for why these countries are essential is based primarily on their “transparent economic size”, not growth rate or opportunities for investor profits (Armijo, 2007: 12).

As another feature, emerging powers demand revisionist changes in the international order; because many are dissatisfied with the current world order. Their strategies in international politics are reformed and try to increase the bargaining power of the developing world within international multilateral organisations such as the WTO or the G20 (Bruera, 2015; 228). These countries are revisionists as they seek to integrate at least some of their fundamental aspects while trying to integrate into the global economic system (Nel and Mathew, 2010: 71).

Today’s rising powers, which made rapid economic progress in the 2000s, differ significantly from their past examples. First, emerging modern powers continue to develop by combining and developing national economies as before and adding some regions and economies to their transnational production and investment networks. In addition, the security vulnerabilities associated with increasing transnational connections have enabled the rising powers to overcome their “governance borders” and to integrate into transnational functional governance networks (Hameiri and Jones, 2015: 80-81).

In summary, the most striking features of these countries are their high growth rates and the size of their market potential. On the other hand, the democratic experience of these countries is not sufficient, and high inflation rates have affected the economy. In addition, population growth rates are mostly higher in these countries than in other developed countries; they have younger and more dynamic populations.

In order to clarify the concept of rising power, a precise classification should be made by determining various criteria. First of all, it should be noted that while every rising power has the status of a developing country, not every developing country can be included in the rising power category. In this sense, O’Neill argues that the balance of power in the global economy is shifting towards developing countries and emphasises the Growth Environment Score (GES) analysis, which was created with five main and 13 sub-indicators to be used in the rising power classification. The main takeaway from this analysis is; strong growth can be achieved with a stable and open economy, healthy investment, high technology adoption rates, a healthy and well-educated workforce, and a safe and rules-based political environment (O’Neill et al., 2005: 3).

Table 1: Growth Environment Score (GES) Used in Rising Power Classification of Countries

Areas Sub-indices
Macroeconomic Stability Inflation
Government Deficit
External Debt
Macroeconomic Conditions Investment Rates
Openness of The Economy
Technological Capabilities Penetration of PCs
Human Capital Education
Life Expectancy
Political Conditions Political Stability
Rule of Law

Source: O’Neill et al., 2005: 10.

Regarding the categorisation of the rising powers, there are several other methods. Yet again, not all of them provide a comprehensive approach to properly determine the power transition. That is why this paper will benefit from Tufekci’s (2016, 103-104) power classification indicators, which is relatively much more detailed and useful for comprehending how rising powers rise. The classification consists of 7 main criteria, and the last heading is divided into 5 subcriteria.


Table 2: Power Classification Indicators

Economic Size
Military Capability
Democratic Development
Demographic and Geographical Capacity
Technological Capability
Human Capital
Soft Power § Foreign Aids
§ Diplomatic Missions
§ Mediation Initiatives
§ Acting in the Peacekeeping Operations
§ International Organizations Membership

Source: Tufekci, 2016: 103-104.

Due to Brazil’s economic strength, its hemispheric leadership, and its growing geostrategic role through multilateral international forums, it is assumed as a vital player in both regional and global politics across numerous dimensions. In this sense, while it is possible to examine the rise of Brazil from several perspectives, this article deals with how Brazil acted in the peacekeeping operations during the Lula era between 2003 and 2011 since the politics of peacebuilding is also one of the criteria to categorise the countries as it is put forward in table 2.

Peacekeeping Operations as a Part of Brazilian Foreign Policy

By the end of the 20th century, Brazil’s foreign policy was based on four principles: protecting the territory, consolidating and strengthening the republic, preventing or resolving conflicts with its neighbours, and maintaining good relations with the United States. Consequently, Brazil’s President, Lula da Silva, proclaimed a course in pursuing Brazil’s leadership in politics and economics as part of a grand strategy which would help spread Latin-American values. To achieve that, Lula highlighted three diplomatic strategies: soft balancing, the creation of a coalition and the desire to position Brazil as the more united leader of South America (Brands, 2012).

Unlike the United States and Russia, Brazil became an economic state without becoming a military state. By applying the “soft power” principle in foreign policy, Brazil offers much more opportunities for developing and influencing international politics. We must admit that the most visible policy of “soft power” manifests itself in the participation of Brazil in various regional and international organisations. Consolidating its position as a generally recognised South American leader, one of the leading players in world politics, and a robust and persistent candidate as a member of the UN Security Council, Brazil actively uses the soft power potential in advancing integration processes and their approaches in various multilateral structures and regional associations. In order to consolidate its leadership in the region and achieve its global interests, Brazil is an active participant in the UN peacekeeping forces, directed financial resources for social projects and trained its military forces. Brazil has a vital position in the peaceful resolution of conflicts, misunderstandings, and crises. It focuses on the relationship between preserving security and sustainable development of the world and is actively involved in the formation of a multipolar system in international relations and democratic world order. The participation of Brazil in the modernisation of the Security Council and readiness to increase its status on the international scene dictates the need for the state to formulate a clear position on critical issues of international cooperation (Kenkel, 2013).

A beneficial aspect of Brazil’s foreign policy is participation in peacekeeping missions, in particular, in the successful United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), headed by Brazil since 2004, which has undoubtedly also consolidated the positive international image that has been blamed for Brazil. This operation opened the potential of Brazil’s role in peacekeeping operations. The country provided the largest contingent of troops, and what is significant; the commander of the operation was always Brazilian. In addition, most of the contingent of peacekeepers consisted of military personnel and specialists from nine countries in Latin America. Brazilian peacekeepers promoted Haiti’s transition to democracy and stability and helped rebuild its territory after the earthquake in January 2010 (UN news, 2011). The country is actively involved in peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions point to the importance of its membership as a permanent representative in the UN Security Council and is pursuing a stable course in addressing the problems of a peaceful atom in the territory of Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in regions subjected to Islamic extremism. In 2007, then Foreign Minister S. Amorim reaffirmed a new policy in the region and the world, saying: “We are aware that statements of Brazilian values and interests in the world are and will be of a global nature. Like it or not, Brazil is not a small country. It does not conduct and will never conduct the foreign policy of a small country” (Martinov, 2014).

The Foreign Minister of Brazil, A. Patriota, at the UN Security Council in 2011, stated that there is a tendency towards coercion, sanctions and hasty military intervention in the modern world, but preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping operations with the three elements should be an alternative to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The United Nations Peacekeeping Commission, along with respect for international law, can play an essential role in preventing a recurrence of conflict (Patriota, 2011).

Defence policy

Brazilian participation in the activities of international organisations and the desire to enhance its status in the international political arena dictates the need for Brazil to formulate a clear position on international cooperation issues. The National Defence policy was revised by the new leadership in 2005. It significantly differed from the strategy of the defence since 1995. In particular, the 2005 version identified the relationship between the national defence strategy and international peace support, multilateral institutions and peacekeeping operations.

It should be noted that the provision of peacekeeping operations has increased significantly with the adoption of consistent political documents. A separate heading for peacekeeping operations is devoted to the National Defence Strategy, as well as a leading role in the preparation of such missions. A significant step in the legal implementation of peacekeeping operations was the adoption in 2008 of a new “Doctrine of Military Defence”, which also emphasises the importance of peaceful operations for the country’s foreign policy purposes but notes that the Armed Forces can participate in peace operations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations if they adhere to its fundamental principles (MoD, 2008).

According to the National Defence Policy (2005), the objectives of national defence are 1) contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security; and 2) their inclusion in the international decision-making process (Ekstrom and Miguel, 2012). Maintaining multilateral structures and vigorous participation in them is enshrined as the best way to realise the interests of Brazil at the international level. Brazil’s interests are defined in terms of multilateral, pacifist, sovereign identity and peaceful operations subordinated to these interests.

The Brazilian National Security Strategy (2008) emphasises the country’s desire to participate in peacekeeping operations. Brazil should increase its participation in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations or regional multilateral organisations, as it is in line with national interests and declared international commitments (MoD, 2008: 17).

Brazilian Peacekeeping Model

Brazil’s engagement with the UN is an example of how the state is influential in the world arena and claims to be the same as the founding states of the Organization. Participation of Brazil in the UN became possible after the signing of the UN Charter by fifty states in 1945 in San Francisco. Since then, Brazil has been actively involved in the work of the United Nations organs and specialised agencies. It is worth noting, however, that at present, the country is not a member of the permanent members of the UN Security Council; Brazil is a candidate for membership as a permanent member with veto power. However, the Federal Republic of Brazil is actively pointing to permanent members of the UN Security Council in its desire to be on an equal footing with permanent member states and to obtain this status.

Since 1948 about 65 peacekeeping and security operations have been carried out, and Brazil has participated in 46 peacekeeping operations. For the first time, the country joined the United Nations peacekeeping operations in 1956, and since then has participated in peacekeeping missions continuously (Brigagão and Aguilar, 2009). However, it should be noted that despite the active peacekeeping activity, there was a problem at the institutional level between the institute of foreign policy and military structures, which increased the tension between diplomats and the military. For a long time, foreign policy was based on the principle of commitment to non-intervention policies. However, the country’s armed forces positioned themselves ready for active peacekeeping operations.

In the recent years, the participation of Western states in UN peacekeeping operations has been reduced, and this gap has been actively filled by “rising” powers, in particular, the members of the BRICS and new players are increasingly taking the lead in these operations. At the time when Lula da Silva became President in 2003, Brazil participated in two UN operations, UNMOS (Angola) and UNMISET (Timor-Leste). Between 2003 and 2011, the country participated in six of the eight UN missions during this period. Brazil participated in the mission on the Sinai Peninsula, was an observer during the civil wars in Africa and Latin America, and participated in Cyprus, the settlement of South-Asian conflicts (East Timor from Indonesia). The contingent of the country is part of peacekeeping forces in Africa: Liberia and Guinea-Bissau (formerly a Portuguese colony). In 2011, Brazilian experts and military experts participated in 7 UN peacekeeping operations in Western Sahara and Côte d’Ivoire (Борзова, 2011).

In 2003, Brazil prepared a report to the UN Security Council with specific recommendations on the sources of conflicts in Africa, ways to prevent and resolve these conflicts, and preparing the basis for lasting peace and economic growth after their permission. The report “On the causes of conflict and the promotion of lasting peace and sustainable development in Africa” was supposed to be the main document for addressing interrelated peace, security, and development issues.

Talking about Brazil’s unique approach to peacekeeping operations, it’s worth recalling the UN humanitarian intervention in Lebanon. This was a tremendous and unique cooperation, both for Brazil and for the UN, since the naval component of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was instructed to ban Hezbollah’s illicit circulation and, with the help of the Council’s resolutions. Brazil has had a unique approach to Lebanon, as it was concerned about the increase in violence in that country and has repeatedly called for the protection of civilians and respect for international law. As a result of this operation, the special attitude of Brazilian peacekeeping contingent to the situation in Lebanon, close friendship and commitment were established between the states. Brazil has found a partner in this region.

Brazil has repeatedly criticised the concept of humanitarian intervention, which is used by the United States and other NATO countries. Thus, in the work of the UN Security Council, Brazil has been actively involved in the development of various concepts. One of them is the idea of “Friends of Mediation”, which describes that the use of contingents should carry little violence to the local population. Moreover, during the period of the use of force, measures should be legitimate and limited to the objectives set out in the resolutions of the Security Council. Another accepted concept was “Responsibility to protect,” which claimed that all responsibility should be exercised first and foremost through the use of diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means. And only if these means cannot achieve the desired result, the possibility of applying coercive measures can be considered (Hamman, 2012). Also, in addition to the already existing concept of responsibility to protect, Brazilian diplomats in 2011 developed the concept of “Responsibility while protecting“, which reduces the risk of armed conflict and human casualties (Ekstrom and Miguel, 2012).

In addition, in Brazil, in the development of preventive diplomacy, the Centre for the Preparation of Peacekeepers was set up in Rio de Janeiro in 2005. Since then, a significant number of volunteers have been trained, and many have remained serving in military structures. The state uses their experience and skills not only outside the country but also internally to solve the problems of crime, especially in the poor parts of the country. Following the conflict in Uganda and Rwanda in the last decades of the last century, a protocol was signed that contains recommendations to the Security Council on the sources of conflicts in Africa. This was followed by a statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 2012, “Causes of Conflict and Promoting Sustainable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa” (Oliver, 2012). This document was the first step in solving the interconnected concepts of peace, security, and development.

The Interests of Brazilian Participation in UNPKO

The involvement of states in peacekeeping activities is determined by various reasons and motivations. For some states, this is a way of realising the country’s own unilateral interests since, in some cases; states view peacekeeping activities as contributing to increasing international prestige or the way they are incorporated into the UN decision-making process. For other states, the motives for participation are external: states may be pressured by allies to participate in a coalition or change their position in relation to a particular conflict context. One more reason for participation may be large financial compensation for peacekeeping activities. But the most important reason is that refusing to participate in this fundamental agenda will necessarily mean a loss of international political influence.

Participation of Brazil in a peacekeeping operation is undoubtedly a successful trend toward developing its own, Latin American form of peacekeeping as a counterpart to the liberal democratic north model that is now being promoted by the UN approach. Obviously, in the Latin American region, Brazil holds leadership positions on almost all issues, so that’s why Brazil coordinates the South American missions, which make up just over half of its membership. The participation of Brazilian blue helmets in peacekeeping missions is nothing but a way of establishing their positions not only in the region but also in the world, and it can also be used as a tool both for national interests and for the implementation of the commandments of Brazilian identity (Cavalcanti, 2013).

Figure 1: Number of Brazilian Military and Civilian Personnel Serving in Peacekeeping Missions Worldwide from 2001 to 2021

What are the goals of Brazil in participating in peacekeeping operations? Peaceful operations allow Brazil to achieve a certain set of goals. Indeed, at first glance, it seems that the main task is to promote foreign policy. However, in fact, participation in the Security Council is not limited to diplomatic objectives, as it includes a number of positive internal changes, such as the training and equipping of the Armed Forces, as well as providing the military with a new, prestigious mission closely linked to the image of the state abroad.

 Talking about the external interests of the state, we can point to the following:

  • improving relations with countries;
  • promote Brazilian trade and investment;
  • strengthening the peaceful resolution of conflicts and mediation;
  • influencing the UN Security Council;
  • creating national interests by involving in international cooperation.

The domestic interests of involving in peacekeeping operations:

  • training of the Armed Forces;
  • employed human resources;
  • formation of a positive image of the army among the population.

Undoubtedly, the policy of official representatives of the state concerning its development is also important. So, if national leaders acknowledge that the interests of their states are linked to the continuation of the international status quo, they would maintain and protect the status quo. International organisations, especially the UN, are the leading actor in providing such support. That deduction is valid for Brazil, as well. During the years of Lula’s presidency, he was chosen to engage in international cooperation with the participation of the state in various forums, negotiations, and associations as economic, political and security to achieve national interests.


Talking about Brazil’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations, we need to emphasise once again the importance of the issue of international security. Definitely, the lack of security is one of the biggest problems in the modern world. Recognition of the struggle for power in relations between states imposes a peculiar pressure on international politics. Obviously, among all BRICS countries, only Brazil takes an active role in changing certain security policy provisions through existing international institutions and norms. Brazil is actively focusing on the relevance of multilateral actions based on cooperation agreements. Summing up the successes of Brazil, it should be pointed out that the period from 2003 to 2011 can be called the prosperity era of the state. President Luisa Ignacio Lula da Silva had started to implement the Brazilian grand strategy, which was based on the transition from unipolar to a multipolar order. The Brazilian economy dramatically improved, which in fact, contributed to the active involvement of the state in international processes, in particular, peacekeeping. During the eight years of the Lula presidency, the government developed a long-term national development strategy and reached an agreement with the United States, which for the first time, had to recognise the regional leadership of Brazil. One of the main objectives of this strategy was a solid international policy that would ensure the realisation of Brazilian interests. President Lula managed that by underlining three diplomatic strategies: soft balancing, the creation of a coalition and the desire to positioning Brazil as the leader of a more united South America. It should be emphasised here that peacekeeping was one way to achieve the realisation of the interests of the grand strategy. This strategy was successful since the profile of Brazil has risen significantly in the international arena, and this has also triggered tremendous internal changes in the country. For example, participation in peacekeeping operations contributed to the improvement of the armed forces, which, in addition to the accumulation of field experience, developed doctrine and training, actively contributing to the development of the state. Brazil firmly assumed its right to join the UN Security Council as a permanent member. Brazil initiated the creation of the South American Defence Council in 2008. The National Defence Strategy adopted in 2008 clearly defined the South Atlantic area as a zone of its “special responsibility” and set the task of building a military force comparable to the most modern armies in the world.

During this period, Brazil was one of the most active members of BRICS with participation in peacekeeping operations. In 2003, Brazil participated in two UN operations, UNMOS (Angola) and UNMISET (Timor-Leste). Between 2003 and 2011, the country participated in six of the eight UN missions during this period. The well-formed policy of the President Lula da Silva has raised Brazil’s profile in the world. In fact, thanks to Lula, the country managed to host the World Cup in 2014, as well as the summer Olympics in 2016, which was also a part of Lula’s grand strategy.

However, it should be emphasised that the implementation of a grand strategy through engaging in world processes by one or another action does not guarantee the country’s entry into the international community as a global player, as it is a long process and requires stable development indicators. Brazil is an excellent example of this. After many years of dynamic economic development and good governance, now the country has suspended its activity in world politics. The biggest problem in Brazil is the lack of internal structures that would support its development. And that would suspend the big dream of being a rising power and changing its status from middle to a global actor in the international system for an indefinite period, as it has happened in the case of Brazil.


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